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BAILEY BROWN BURLESON: Support for Regionalist and Nationalist Political Parties 
in Spain (Under the direction of Dr. Miguel Centellas) 
 
This research investigates the variation across the autonomous communities of 
Spain in the level of support for both regionalist and nationalist political parties such as 
the new far-right political party, Vox. This research looks at four cases: Andalusia, 
Catalonia, Galicia, and Murcia. Together these cases represent a spectrum of regionalist 
sentiment, support for regionalist parties, and support for nationalist parties. Using survey 
data from the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas ahead of the Spanish general 
election of November 2019, this thesis analyzes individual-level determinants of voting 
behavior corresponding to regionalist and nationalist political parties in Spain. Of the 
individual-level determinants of voting behavior with regard to the particular parties, the 
demographic variables such as gender, age, religiosity, education level, and ideological 
self-placement as well as the perception of immigration as a major Spanish issue showed 
the greatest distinction between voters of regionalist parties and voters of nationalist 
parties. Economic and political evaluations, the influence of the Catalan Independence 
Movement, and personal income were variables that were significant in the same manner 
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 There is a varying degree of support for regionalist political parties. In certain 
autonomous communities, substate nationalism and strong regional identification has 
historically been more prevalent. Catalonia has made news recently for its strong support 
for an independence movement and has very often had strong support for regionalist 
political parties even in Spanish general elections. However, certain autonomous 
communities like Andalusia have not had the same level of support for these types of 
parties. In an autonomous community like Andalusia, there has been some level of 
support for regionalist parties in more local elections but not strong enough to appear in 
national elections. Instead, Andalusia has seen recent support in national elections for 
Vox, a party that represents many of the opposite views of regionalist parties with regard 
to the Spanish state. This presents a curious case in which Andalusia could have the 
potential to have growth in their regionalist party support but instead has growth of the 
opposite type of party. 
Various Catalan regionalist parties have had a degree of electoral success. These 
parties can be found on both sides of the political ideological spectrum, and not all 
Catalan regionalist parties advocate for separatism. Some examples of Catalan regionalist 
parties that have had electoral success are Together for Catalonia (Junts per Catalunya, 
JxCAT), Republican Left of Catalonia (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, ERC), and 
Popular Unity Candidacy (Candidatura d’Unitat Popular, CUP). Regionalist parties 
similar to the types found in Catalonia are found in other autonomous communities, but 
 




not all of these have been as successful in elections. An example of this is one of 
Andalusia’s recent semi-prominent regionalist parties the Andalusian Party (Partido 
Andalucista, PA) that dissolved in 2014 after merging with another party and losing 
seats. 
However, Spain has also, until the past few years, lacked a strong far-right 
movement. This “Spanish Exceptionalism” (Turnbull-Dugarte 2019, Ortiz Barquero 
2019) appears to be at its end with the creation and rise in popularity of the party Vox. In 
the most recent elections, Andalusia has seen growing support for Vox, a right-wing 
nationalist party that advocates for a more united Spain with less emphasis on individual 
autonomous communities. Support for Vox has grown throughout Spain in recent years 
but not equally in every autonomous community. An example of this is how Catalonia 
has had much less support for Vox than Andalusia has had.  
Why does support for regionalist parties vary across the different autonomous 
communities of Spain? Why has a nationalist party like Vox found electoral success in 
Andalusia and other autonomous communities across Spain when it is seemingly the 
antithesis of a regionalist party and substate nationalism? This research examines 
individual factors that influence voting behavior pertaining to the rise of far-right parties, 
the strength of regionalist parties, and any potential interaction between the two. 
 
Nationalism and Party Success or Failure 
 The substate nationalism and sense of identity that exists in Spain’s autonomous 
communities prompts the creation of regionalist parties that either advocate for more 
autonomy with the extreme case being independence or advocate for certain issues on 
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behalf of the autonomous community. According to the constructivist school of thought, 
national identity is created rather than something that has always existed in a community 
or group (Anderson 2016, Hobsbawm 1992, Gellner and Breuilly 2008). This school 
stresses the fact that nationalism and the idea of a nation is a relatively new concept in the 
history of the world. One of the major points of Hobsbawm (1990) is that nationalism is a 
product of modernity. Anderson (2016) discusses how print capitalism as well as the 
decline of older, powerful institutions such as the Catholic church and “the dynastic 
realm” have led to the birth and growth of nationalism agreeing with the idea that 
nationalism has only come about in more recent eras of history.  
Anderson writes that a nation is an “imagined political community” (2016). He 
elaborates that a nation is made up of people that feel a connection towards other 
members of the group whether or not they personally know the other members. In other 
words, there exists a national consciousness (Anderson 2016). Hobsbawm (1990) asserts 
that this “national consciousness” does not exist evenly across a state and agrees that it is 
not an idea that predates states or nations. In fact, many constructivist thinkers 
(Hobsbawm 1990, Gellner and Breuilly 2008) directly assert that it is nationalism itself 
that created the “nation”. 
My research relates to this particular definition of nations and nationalism 
because I examine variables that may be relevant in how individuals and the autonomous 
communities create these identities and in how that relates to the success of regionalist 
and nationalist political parties. In other words, my research looks at the individual-level 
variables that are common in individuals who choose to align with regionalist or 
nationalist political parties.  
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A second major concept with my research is why parties fail or succeed. Heinrich 
W. Ursprung (1984) identifies two different types of explanations for party success: 
theories of a sociological nature or theories from the economic approach. The economic 
approach is that economic reasons can explain all types of human behavior while the 
sociological approach operates under the assumption that certain sociological variables 
can influence attitudes and behaviors of individuals (Ursprung 1984). In Ursprung’s 
(1984) view, the reasoning behind the economic approach is that economic motives can 
explain human behavior and that humans, as rational beings, will act in their own benefit 
in an attempt to accomplish their desires. This relates to voting behavior because voters 
will vote in a manner that will benefit them. In later chapters, this will be relevant to 
theories such as the “losers” of modernization theory in which individuals are likely to 
vote in opposition to what they see as the cause of their economic troubles. The 
sociological approach looks at how a variety of determinants influence the individual and 
their preferences (Ursprung 1984).  
Kay Lawson and Peter H. Merkl (1988) propose a theory of linkage in which 
major parties “fail” when they fail to provide enough effective linkage between the 
individuals and the state. They discuss how alternative organizations in four categories, 
environmentalist, supplementary, communitarian, and anti-authoritarian, have been able 
to gain support (Lawson and Merkl 1988). Another topic discussed is the definitions of 
“failure” or “success”. These definitions can be relative: a major party might define 
success as being the party in charge of the government, while success for a minor party 
might entail being part of a coalition government or having its goals adopted by a major 
party (Lawson and Merkl 1988). Through my analysis, I can identify particular groups of 
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people that might be affected by this failure of linkage with the major parties and have 
instead turned to peripheral parties.  
 
Research Design 
 In order to look at reasons for certain parties receiving or not receiving electoral 
support, I analyze individual-level variables as determinants for voting for each type of 
political party involved in my original research question: both nationalist and regionalist. 
I include four different particular cases that each represent a spectrum of regionalist 
sentiment as well as support for either nationalist or regionalist parties.  
 
Case Selection  
In choosing my cases, I was interested in two main variables: regionalist vs. 
nationalist sentiment and support for regionalist or nationalist political parties. I wanted 
to have a spectrum that represented several combinations of these variables. The four 
cases I have chosen are: Andalusia, Catalonia, Galicia, and Murcia. Catalonia and Galicia 
are both what is described as “historic nations” or autonomous communities that have 
been designated as having greater cultural distinctiveness and consequently greater 
regionalist sentiment. However, the support for regionalist parties is not the same across 
all of these autonomous communities that are “historic nations.” Catalonia has a much 
higher level of support for regionalist parties than Galicia.  Regionalist sentiment and 
identity is also not the same across the other autonomous communities. Preliminary data 
shows that Andalusia has a lower sense of regional identity than the historic nations like 
Catalonia, but it does have a higher sense of regional identity compared to an 
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autonomous community like Murcia. Vox, a far-right nationalist party, also has a high 
level of support in Andalusia and Murcia. 
Andalusia, my primary case, is an outlier through its contradictions. Andalusia 
does have a moderately high level of regionalist sentiment compared to an autonomous 
community such as Murcia. However, regionalist parties have not had much electoral 
support in Andalusia, when compared to other autonomous communities like Catalonia 
and the Basque Country. In recent elections, there has also been high support for Vox, a 
Spanish nationalist party that wants to deemphasize autonomous communities, in 
Andalusia. This is interesting because not only does Andalusia have a lack of significant 
support for regionalist parties, but it also has shown to have greater support for a party 
that might be considered an opposite to regionalist parties.  
Catalonia, my second case, is frequently classified as a historic nation. While 
similar to Andalusia in that the regionalist sentiment is higher than in other autonomous 
communities, Catalonia has a different outcome. In Catalonia, support is higher for 
regionalist parties than in Andalusia. Regionalist parties have even had success at the 
national level. Support for Vox is much lower in Catalonia. Since certain undeniable 
differences exist between an autonomous community like Catalonia and an autonomous 
community like Andalusia, I include two more cases to provide additional controls.  
Galicia is another autonomous community that is frequently described as a 
“historic nation” or “historic nationality”. In contrast to Catalonia, however, it does not 
have the same high level of support for regionalist parties. In fact, it can be considered an 
outlier among the historic nations in that it does not have the same level of support for 
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regionalist parties in their political system like Catalonia or the Basque Country (Hamann 
1999).  
Murcia and Andalusia have had some of the highest growth in support for Vox 
while the “historic nations'' like Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque Country have had 
some of the lowest growth in Vox. While both Galicia and the Basque Country would be 
interesting additions to my research, I believe that Galicia would be the better addition as 
it has more differences in level of regionalist party support to Catalonia than the Basque 
Country does.  
 
Data Sources 
I plan to use survey data produced by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas. 
My data for my analysis comes from the survey titled “Barómetro de Noviembre 2019” 
(Barometer of November 2019). This data was gathered through interviews conducted in 
the weeks preceding the national election of November 2019. The survey asks 
respondents about what party they intend to vote for in that election as well as a variety 
of questions pertaining to demographic information, political opinions, and economic 
status. I also reference some regional post electoral surveys. These surveys are the most 
recent post electoral surveys for each case that was provided by the Centro de 
Investigaciones Sociológicas: Catalonia (Postelectoral de Cataluña. Elecciones 
Autonómicas 2017), Andalusia (Postelectoral Elecciones Autonómicas 2018 Comunidad 
Autónoma de Andalucía 2018), Murcia (Postelectoral Elecciones Autonómicas 2015. 





Dependent Variable  
My dependent variables are support for two types of peripheral political parties 
paying special attention to my cases of Catalonia, Andalusia, Murcia, and Galicia.  
“Nationalist parties” are those parties that advocate for Spanish nationalism or are 
in direct opposition to substate nationalisms within Spain. “Nationalist parties” includes 
both Ciudadanos and Vox. However, as is discussed later in this paper, Ciudadanos is not 
as extreme as Vox. Therefore, I have also decided to look at the voters for Vox separately 
as a subcategory of nationalist parties.  
“Regionalist parties” are the regional parties within at least one of my cases that 
advocate for greater autonomy for the autonomous community they represent. However, 
it is important to note that nationalism is a factor in both of these types of parties. 
“Regionalist parties” include regionalist parties from Catalonia and Galicia. Of all my 
cases, only regionalist parties from Catalonia and Galicia received support from the 
respondents for the upcoming election. I have also decided to create two subcategories of 
“regionalist parties.” These two subcategories are “Catalan regionalist parties” and 
“Galician regionalist parties.” These different subcategories will allow me to see any 
differences between the individual determinants that affect a voter’s decision to vote for 
regionalist parties of each autonomous community. 
   
Independent Variables  
My independent variables are categorized into three groups: demographic 
variables, performance variables, and political variables. Demographic variables include 
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gender, age, religiosity, education level, and personal income. Performance-related 
variables include the perception of the current economic situation in Spain and the 
perception of the current political situation in Spain. Political variables include the 
influence of Catalan independence movement on vote, self-placement on a left-right scale 
of ideology, and choice of major issues facing Spain. 
 
Hypotheses 
 I develop the following hypotheses to explain a voter’s choice.  
● H1: As negative feelings about the current political situation increase, support for 
peripheral parties like the regionalist parties or Vox will increase.  
● H2: People who state that their vote was influenced by the independence 
movement in Catalonia will be more likely to vote for peripheral parties, whether 
regionalist parties or Vox. 
● H3: People who state that one of the major problems facing Spain is immigration 
will be more likely to vote for Vox.  
● H4: The Catalan Independence Movement will be an important issue for voters of 
all types of parties.  
 
Structure of Paper 
 After this brief introduction, Chapter 1 focuses on broad theories and concepts 
underlying my research such as nationalism and party success and failure. Chapter 2 
narrows the focus to Spain-specific background information on the political system 
relating to substate nationalism and previous research done surrounding these topics. 
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Chapter 3 includes a brief overview of each case as well as some descriptive statistics 
providing background on how each autonomous community stands with regard to 
nationalistic sentiment and voting behavior. Chapter 4 gives an overview of the political 
parties included in my analysis and how they are organized into my dependent variables. 
Chapter 5 presents my data and analysis as well as more in-depth information on 
methodology. My conclusion follows Chapter 5. 
  
 








 The study of nationalism focuses primarily around two schools of thought: 
primordialism and constructivism. Primordialism is the idea that nations and the qualities 
that define nations have always been salient and present. Nations are set in stone and 
have always existed among groups of people. Constructivism refers to the idea that 
nationalism and the sense of “nation-ness” is a constructed idea or concept by the group 
of people that it pertains to. A nation is not defined by unchangeable criteria or qualities 
but rather by the changing perceptions and beliefs about identity of the people within the 
so-called “nation”. 
In the words of Benedict Anderson (2016), a nation is an “imagined community” 
because while no member can be fully acquainted with every other member of the 
“nation,” each feels a connection to the other creating a salient and distinct group in the 
eyes of the community. These nations are often defined by cultural, linguistic, and ethnic 
differences that seem to have always defined groups and “nations,” but it is important to 
note that, in the constructivist school of thought, “nationalism” is a new movement and 
idea that came to be with the modern era (Anderson 2016, Hobsbawm 1990, Gellner and 
Breuilly 2008). Modernity and elements that caused the modern age like print capitalism 
caused the growth of nationalism (Anderson 2016, Hobsbawm 1990).  
 




It is also important to note that the “nation” and the “state,” while often conflated 
in common speech, are not equivalent (Gellner and Breuilly 2008). This is evident in how 
with certain states such as Spain, the national consciousness and the sense of identity of 
citizens are not evenly distributed. The “nation” and the “state” are not equally strong and 
defined entities. This makes it interesting to look at the competing “nations” within a 
state like Spain. 
 
Party Success and Failure 
 When thinking about the success or failure of political parties, it is important to 
consider what qualifies as a success or failure. Depending on the particular study or 
purpose of research, each can be defined differently. Success can be defined as becoming 
the party of the government, winning elections, receiving some support in elections (in 
the case of peripheral parties), or even having the agenda of a peripheral party adopted by 
a major political party (Lawson and Merkl 2007). This last idea about what qualifies as 
success can be attributed to a type of political party that Lawson and Merkl label as a 
supplementary political party which represents particular policies that might be adopted 
by a mainstream party if the supplementary party receives enough attention from the 
public (1988). Parties like supplementary parties as well as parties that are labelled as 
environmentalist, communitarian, and anti-authoritarian are the parties that are given 
support when the major political parties “fail” (Lawson and Merkl 2007).  
 Failure for political parties can be defined as what happens when major or 
mainstream parties fail to garner the same amount of electoral support or are in decline in 
the political arena of a country (Lawson and Merkl 1988). When, this happens, something 
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else will take up that place with voters whether they be movements or peripheral parties. 
Lawson and Merkl hypothesize that the reasons major parties fail and minor parties gain 
support is through the linkage theory (Lawson and Merkl 1988). Linkage theory states 
that major parties lose support when they fail to provide adequate connections or 
“linkage” between the voter and the party’s decisions and actions (Lawson and Merkl 
1988). After this failure to link the voter and the party, the voters may look elsewhere for 
that desired linkage and connection (Lawson and Merkl 1988). 
 
Theories Applied in Existing Research 
 Articles studying party success or failure in Spain look at several different 
theories that might explain voting behavior. The basis of these theories varies from 
economic, cultural identity, and even psychological.  Below is a brief overview of 
theories referenced in regard to voting determinants that were most common in the 
existing literature.  
 
Regional Language 
 A primordialist perspective of nationalism proposes that there are certain cultural 
and ethnic factors that make a “nation” and decide the strength of behavior related to that 
“nation.” In the context of Spain, the most distinctive cultural element that separates one 
autonomous community from the other is the presence of a regional language. Many 
theorists (Bollen and Medrano 1998, Sorens 2005) study how much a regional language 




Economic Development and Losers of Modernization Theory 
 In economic terms, theorists (Sorens 2005, Georgiadou, Rori, and Roumanias 
2018, Bollen and Medrano 1998, Ortiz Barquero 2019) studying Spain often look at data 
relevant to the wealth of autonomous communities as a whole or the wealth of individuals 
and how likely they are to support certain movements to autonomy as well as opinions 
toward immigrants. Sorens (2005) discusses if, at the regional level, there would be 
greater economic benefit of greater autonomy/secessionism. Autonomous communities 
that would be worse off after independence, like Andalusia, would be less likely to 
support secessionism; therefore, the hypothesis would follow that wealthier regions 
would be more supportive of a potential move towards independence (Sorens 2005). This 
same logic could apply to individuals who feel that they would suffer economic losses if 
the situation of autonomy changed. 
 The theory of the “losers” of modernization is a theory most often applied to 
voters of far-right nationalist parties that suffer losses as a result of modernization and 
globalization (Bollen and Medrano 1998, Ortiz Barquero 2019, Georgiadou, Rori, and 
Roumanias 2018). This theory will be discussed more fully in the following chapter in 
the section on “Spanish Exceptionalism.” 
 
Anti-Immigrant Rhetoric 
 A theory closely related to that of the losers of modernization theory in much of 
the existing research is the identity vulnerability theory that relates to anti-immigrant 
sentiment (Ortiz Barquero 2019, Georgiadou, Rori, and Roumanias 2018). The “losers” 
of modernization can often become anti-immigrant when their economic losses are 
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accompanied by a growth of discourse about immigration (Georgiadou, Rori, and 
Roumanias 2018). Ortiz Barquero (2019) hypothesizes that due to the increasing salience 
of immigration in Spain and Andalusia, the rise of far-right political parties can be in part 










Spanish Political System and Case Overview 
 
 Spain is divided into seventeen autonomous communities each with varying 
degrees of autonomy. Many of these autonomous communities have distinct cultures and 
even languages in certain autonomous communities such as Galicia, Catalonia, and the 
Basque Country. Certain ones of these autonomous communities have been designated as 
“historic nations” in Spain and are often given higher degrees of autonomy. Within these 
particular autonomous communities, it is often more common to have regionalist parties 
that receive a higher level of support and a higher level of substate nationalism  
 
Center-Periphery Cleavage 
 When studying political parties in Spain, it is important to note that there is a 
second important divide within the Spanish political system along with the normal left vs. 
right cleavage. This second dimension of Spanish politics is the center vs periphery 
cleavage. With the way the Spanish state is set up with separate autonomous communities 
that have varying levels of autonomy and decentralization, there are parties that exist with 
agendas not necessarily based around the typical left-right spectrum but also around the 
opinions for or against further decentralization. This, rather than the typical left-right 
divide, is the basis of this paper. While a left vs. right ideology is undeniably important 
when studying center vs. periphery parties, it is not guaranteed that parties on either side 
 




of the center-periphery cleavage are always right or always left. Generally, the Spanish 
parties that are proponents of a more centralized state and less autonomy for specific 
autonomous communities are more on the right. However, with parties that are 
proponents of further decentralization are much more varied. As they, the “regionalist” 
parties, are generally specific to an autonomous community, there is no set ideology or 
political leanings that is true across all the “regionalist” parties.  
 
Spanish Exceptionalism  
 The concept of “Spanish Exceptionalism” (Turnbull-Dugarte 2019, Ortiz 
Barquero 2019) refers to the lack of a far-right extremist party in Spain’s recent history 
when other European countries have had recent movements for these types of parties. 
This “Spanish Exceptionalism” was even more curious when considering that Spain has 
many of the normal conditions for this type of far-right movement including the 
economic and unemployment troubles Spain faces (Turnbull-Dugarte 2019). However, 
with the rise of the political party Vox, there seems to be an end to what was once 
“Spanish Exceptionalism.” This is one of the curiosities that prompted this particular 
research into studying why voters have decided to vote for a party like Vox. This growth 
has been different across Spain with more support in certain autonomous communities 
than others. This was marked by Vox’s success in the regional elections in Andalusia in 
2018 that showed that “Spanish Exceptionalism” was truly over.  
 There have been recent studies attempting to explain “why now?” with regards to 
the end of Spanish Exceptionalism. In a study by Turnbull-Dugarte (2019), it was noted 
that at the time of the growth of Vox, Spain had been facing newer issues that generally 
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spark political movements of this nature. Two of these issues were the Catalan 
independence movement holding a referendum for Catalan Independence and the growth 
of the migrant population in Spain of which the opinions against the further autonomy of 
regions like Catalonia proved to be significant in voting for Vox (Turnbull-Dugarte 
2019).  
 An economic explanation for the end of “Spanish Exceptionalism” is that the rise 
of Vox in Spain can be attributed to the theory concerning the “losers” of modernization 
or globalization; Ortiz Barquero (2019) looks at this explanation among others noting that 
Andalusia, an autonomous community with a higher level of support for Vox, has had a 
lower GDP per capita. This theory proposes that individuals who are negatively affected 
by a more modern and globalized world tend to use immigrants and minorities as a 
scapegoat for their own economic problems (Ortiz Barquero 2019). In the case of Spain, 
this would seem to push voters affected by modernization towards Vox, a party with anti-
immigrant stances. As Ortiz Barquero (2019) points out, this anti-immigration stance 
would only be aided by the idea that immigrants are a threat to the idea of the 
homogenous nation. This economic theory about why individuals turn to far-right 
movements combine both ideas about nationalism and the push against immigration that 
are both important to Vox in Spain. However, Spain has been having economic issues 
before the rise of Vox, and this particular theory does not have much support in the 







 The four cases I study are the autonomous communities of Andalusia, Catalonia, 
Galicia, and Murcia. They represent a spectrum of nationalist sentiment as well as levels 
of support for regionalist and nationalist political parties. Table 2-1 summarizes how 
individuals feel regarding their national identity in each case. This “nationalist sentiment” 
represents whether each respondent identifies more with Spain, their autonomous 
community, or both equally. In the surveys in which this data was found, the respondents 
were asked which of the statements they most agreed with.  
Andalusia and Murcia are the cases that identify least with their autonomous 
community with Catalonia and Galicia identifying the most with their autonomous 
community. One reason to explain this is that Catalonia and Galicia are both “historic 
nations” that received autonomy sooner than other autonomous communities. They also 
both have a more distinct culture from Spain as a whole. Both have their own regional 
languages: Catalan and Gallego. However, there is also some difference between these 
two cases. Catalonia has a higher percentage of respondents that feel more Catalan than 
Spanish. There is also a difference between Andalusia and Murcia. Andalusia has higher 
levels of nationalist sentiment than Murcia. These autonomous communities represent a 









Table 2-1 Descriptive Statistics of Nationalist Sentiment Across Cases 
Level of Nationalist Sentiment Andalusia 
 
Catalonia Galicia Murcia 
Feel only Spanish 5.9 5.5 3.5 8.8 
Feel more Spanish than ---- 5.7 6.3 3.6 4.8 
Feel as Spanish as ---- 74.2 38.2 68.8 83.1 
Feel more ---- than Spanish 10.0 24.4 18.8 1.9 
Feel Uniquely/Only ---- 1.1 21.5 4.0 0.3 
N.S. 1.0 1.2 0.4 0.6 
N.C. 2.2 2.8 0.9 0.5 
Total Respondents 2,913 2,450 2,865 791 
Source: “Postelectoral de Cataluña. Elecciones Autonómicas 2017” (2017) , “Postelectoral Elecciones 
Autonómicas 2018 Comunidad Autónoma de Andalucía” (2018), “Postelectoral de Galicia. Elecciones 
Autonómicas 2016” (2016), “Postelectoral Elecciones Autonómicas 2015. Región de Murcia 2015” (2015) 
 
 There is also a similar pattern when looking at our dependent variables. Votes for 
regionalist parties are highest in Catalonia and Galicia. While neither Andalusia nor 
Murcia have much regionalist party support on a national level, Andalusia does have 
regionalist parties that gain support in regional elections. Andalusia and Murcia also have 
the higher level of Vox support while Catalonia and Galicia have much less.  Hamann 
(1999) gathered data to classify each autonomous community into three categories 
depending on how much support for regionalist parties was present in each autonomous 
community. His three classifications were as follows: 1. Regionalist parties have won a 
majority in an election, 2. Regionalist parties have at least ten percent of the vote, and 3. 
Regionalist parties have less than ten percent of the vote (Hamann 1999). Of my cases, 
Catalonia fell under the first category, Galicia and Andalusia fell under the second 
category, and Murcia fell under the third category (Hamann 1999). However, it is 
important to note that Hamann’s (1999) data and classifications is outdated. While this 
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data is old, it does show how the autonomous communities stood then and how they have 








Chapter 3  
Political Parties 
 
Although Spain has many different political parties, only certain parties receive a 
high enough level of support that would make them competitive in national or even 
autonomous community elections. The two most widely supported parties are Partido 
Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) and Partido Popular (PP). PSOE is the mainstream 
left-wing party while PP is the mainstream right-wing party. My research pertains to 
peripheral parties that do not receive enough votes to be a contender to be the party of the 
government, at least not on their own.  
The political parties included in my analysis are parties that satisfy two criteria: 1) 
The party qualifies as either a regionalist party within Andalusia, Catalonia, Galicia, or 
Murcia or a nationalist party. 2) The party was indicated as the party for which at least 
one respondent in the survey data intended to vote. In Table 3-1, I have classified each 
political party that fits the criteria as either “nationalist” or “regionalist” according to the 
definitions of each of those terms that I have previously set forward in this paper. I have 










Table 3-1 Spanish Political Parties  
Political Party Party Type Area of Influence 
Vox Nationalist National 
Ciutadans-Partido de la Ciudadanía (C’s) or Ciudadanos  Nationalist National 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) Regionalist Catalonia 
Candidatura d’Unitat Popular (CUP) Regionalist Catalonia 
En Comú-Podem (ECP)  Regionalist Catalonia 
Junts per Catalunya (JxCAT) Regionalist Catalonia 
Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG) Regionalist Galicia 
En Marea Regionalist Galicia 
En Común-Unidas Podemos Regionalist Galicia 
Source: Parties found from CIS surveys: “Barómetro de Noviembre 2019” (2019)  
 
In the following sections, I briefly discuss each political party included in my 




The category “nationalist parties” includes parties that are Spanish nationalist 
parties: Ciudadanos and Vox. Using survey data, I show how respondents viewed these 
particular parties in relation to the two mainstream parties on a 10-point left-right 
ideological scale. (see Table 3-2). We can see that the mainstream right-wing PP is very 
similar to Ciudadanos in terms of the public’s perception of its ideology while Vox is 





Table 3-2 Descriptive Statistics of Left-Right Placement of Political Parties (1= Most 




PSOE 4.15 1.57 
PP 7.83 1.38 
Ciudadanos 7.03 1.71 
Vox 9.38 1.25 
Source: “Barómetro de Noviembre 2019” (2019)   
 
Ciudadanos is much less extreme than Vox. However, it is important to include in 
this analysis because it is a party that was born of anti-regionalism in Catalonia. This 
makes it a potential alternative to Vox in the eyes of voters who oppose greater regional 
autonomy but do not see themselves as extreme as Vox. To only use Vox as a measure of 
nationalist party variables would potentially leave out groups of voters.  
Ciudadanos began in 2006 in Catalonia as a rejection of the regionalist parties 
there that were focused on greater autonomy and cultural distinctiveness for the 
autonomous community (Teruel and Barrio 2016). As this party grew to be a national 
party with support in national elections and in other regional elections across Spain, its 
discourse and aims have shifted. However, its origins make it relevant for my analysis, 
especially as an alternative for Catalan voters who may primarily see it as a party against 
the regionalist parties of Catalonia that advocate for more autonomy and at the extreme, 
independence.  
Vox is a newer party on the right that has recently emerged and grown in 
popularity. Andalusia and Murcia have shown some of the highest support and growth of 
Vox in Spain. This is a party that advocates Spanish nationalism as well as other ideas 
rooted in the far-right. This party’s recent popularity ended what was known as “Spanish 
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Exceptionalism” since Spain had for so long avoided the rise of the radical right that was 
occurring throughout Europe in recent history. One explanation includes the Catalan 
Independence Movement being a trigger for its growth and popularity (Turnbull-Dugarte 
2019). Another possibility is preferences for a more central Spanish state as well as right-
leaning ideology to be some of the factors explaining Vox support (Ortiz Barquero 2019). 
 
Regionalist Parties 
 The regionalist parties included in this analysis are only the regionalist parties that 
received some “intention to vote for” in one of my four cases. Catalonia and Galicia both 
had political parties that fit these criteria. In order to see if there is some difference in the 
regionalist parties from each of the two cases, I have also separated them into separate 
dependent variables.  
 
Catalan Regionalist Parties 
 Catalonia has a wide variety of regionalist political parties. Many of them lean left 
but not all. Some of them advocate for total independence while others only for greater 
autonomy. The four Catalan regionalist parties that met the criteria for my analysis are 
Junts per Catalunya (JxCat, Together for Catalonia), Esquerra Republicana de 
Catalumya (ERC, Catalan Republican Left), Candidatura d’Unitat Popular (CUP, 






Galician Regionalist Parties 
 The Galician regionalist parties that managed to receive votes in the general 
elections are fewer. Unlike the Catalan regionalist parties, they do not have the same 
national influence. There were three that fit the criteria including two that are more 
similar to coalitions with some Galician regionalist interests and parties included. 
However, they were included in the analysis because the Galician voter would be able to 
recognize where their interests were represented. The three parties are Bloque 
Nacionalista Galego (BNG, Galician Nationalist Bloc), Unidas-Podemos (United We 
Can), and En Marea. 
  
 





Data and Analysis 
 
My data comes from a national survey conducted by the Centro de 
Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) in Spain. This organization conducts multiple studies 
throughout the year including national barometers for each month, as well as pre- and 
post-election surveys within each autonomous community for elections at the regional 
level. For general elections, the barometers in the electoral months are targeted to 
election-related questions, such as about vote intention and other political variables. I use 
the November 2019 Barometer. This survey was administered through interviews within 
the period of October 28 to November 9, 2019. The general election took place on 
November 10. Every autonomous community was included in this survey, which had 
4,805 total participants out of 5,000 potential respondents. Within my cases of interest, 
there were varying numbers of responses. In Andalusia, there were 651 respondents of 
the 700 potential respondents. In Catalonia, there were 586 respondents of the 594 
potential respondents. In Galicia, there were 250 respondents of 250 potential 
respondents. In Murcia, there were 192 respondents of 200 potential respondents. The 
number of potential surveys dispensed in each autonomous community was determined 
by population
 





My dependent variables are the intention to vote for the specific types of political 
parties and specific political parties in the then-upcoming November 10 election. I 
discussed how specific political parties are classified in the previous chapter. However, in 
the context of my analysis, the dependent variable (party type) is labelled as “nationalist,” 
“Vox,” “regionalist,” “Catalan regionalist,” and “Galician regionalist.” Each of these was 
then converted into binary variables. They are coded as 0 if respondents did not intend to 
vote for the indicated party or type of party and coded as 1 if the respondents intended to 
vote for the indicated party.  
 Table 4-1 presents some descriptive statistics on each dependent variable. As 
previously discussed, the variables are coded as binary variables. One can see that each of 
these types of parties are peripheral parties. The majority of respondents did not intend to 
vote for any of the parties included in the dependent variables. However, the voters that 
did intend to vote for one of these peripheral parties are the interest of further analysis. 
 




Intention to vote for Nationalist Parties 0.12 0.33 
Intention to vote for Vox 0.07 0.26 
Intention to vote for Regionalist Parties 0.06 0.24 
Intention to vote for Catalan Regionalist Parties 0.05 0.21 
Intention to vote for Galician Regionalist Parties 0.01 0.11 






My independent variables are divided into categories for the purposes of 
organization. I have demographic, performance, and political variables. The demographic 
variables include gender, age, religiosity, and education level. Along with the traditional 
demographic variables, I have also included the economic variable of personal income. 
My performance variables are an evaluation of the current economic situation in Spain 
and an evaluation of the current political situation in Spain. My political variables include 
marking the Catalan Independence Movement as a current major issue in Spain, marking 
immigration as a current major issue in Spain, whether or not the Catalan Independence 
Movement influenced the vote of the respondent, and a self-placement on the left-right 
spectrum. Below, I discuss how I coded each variable for the analysis. For variables that 
included answers of “Did not answer” or “Did not know,” I removed those answers from 
the data and turned them into missing values. I wanted my analysis to focus on the 
respondents that had an answer to the question posed.  
 The demographic variables are coded as follows. The variable of gender is coded 
as a binary variable with 1 being “male” and 0 being “female.” The variable of age has 
not been changed. It remains the same as that of the original data.  
The variable of religiosity is condensed into three categories. The first category 
(coded 1) is titled “Religious” and includes the answers of “Practicing Catholic” and 
“Other Religion”. The second category (coded 2) is solely the answer “Non-practicing 
Catholic.” I chose to make this a separate category from the “Religious” category because 
it is very common in Spain to have people who are culturally Catholic but are not actively 
religious. There is a large portion of the population that falls into this category, and this 
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group of people may behave differently to the group that consider themselves actively 
religious. The third category (coded 3) is the “Nonreligious” category and includes those 
that answered “Agnostic,” “Indifferent/No belief,” and “Atheist.”  
The variable of education level has been condensed into seven categories. The 
first category (coded 1) is those that reported less than 5 years of education or no 
education. The second category (coded 2) is those that reported having a primary 
education. The third category (coded 3) is those that reported having the first step of a 
secondary education (in Spain this means not continuing on to Bacherillato). The fourth 
category (coded 4) is those that completed the second step of secondary education 
(Bacherillato). The fifth category (coded 5) is those that reported some type of vocational 
or professional training. The sixth category (coded 6) is all types of higher degrees. The 
seventh category (coded 7) is any other degrees not specifically asked about in the 
survey. In summary, the general trend of this variable is that a higher number is 
equivalent to a higher level of education.  
I decided to use personal income as a more economic-related demographic 
variable. This variable differs from the variable of household income. I am interested in 
potentially distinguishing a certain group of people through the use of the variable of 
personal income. When comparing the distributions of both personal income and 
household income, household income is normally distributed. Personal income is not 
normally distributed as it has a large group of individuals that reported little or no 
personal income. This group disappears when looking at the normally distributed 
household income. This implies that there is a group of people who live in a household 
with income, but personally, they lack their own income. This group of people could be 
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the unemployed, most likely younger individuals caught up in the youth unemployment 
crisis in Spain and still living at home. Is this group of people more likely to vote for 
peripheral parties as a result of their dissatisfaction? By using personal income over 
household income, I can take this specific group into account.   
The performance variables of economic evaluation and political evaluation have 
both been condensed into three categories. The first category (coded 1) is “Positive 
Feelings” about the economic or political situation. This corresponds to the answers 
“good” and “very good.” The second category (coded 2) includes respondents who have 
neither positive nor negative feelings about the economic or political situation. This 
corresponds to the answer “regular.” The third category (coded 3) is “Negative Feelings” 
about the economic or political situation. This corresponds to the answers “bad” and 
“very bad.”  
The political variables are slightly more complicated. The variables pertaining to 
perception of major issues in Spain as either the Catalan Independence Movement or 
immigration are the combination of three questions asked in the survey. The survey asked 
the participants what they perceived as the major issues in Spain. They were asked for a 
first choice, second choice, and third choice in three separate questions. I combined the 
answers of these three questions into one binary variable for each response of interest: 
Catalan Independence Movement and Immigration.  If a respondent listed the Catalan 
Independence Movement in any of the three choices, they were coded as 1 for “yes” (i.e., 
the respondent viewed CIM as an important issue). Respondents who did not list this 
were coded as 0 for “no.” I used the same process for the issue of immigration. If a 
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respondent answer immigration for any of their three choices, they were coded as 1 or 
“yes” (and 0 for “no” if they did not).  
The variable of whether or not the Catalan Independence Movement affected their 
vote was directly asked by the survey as a yes or no question. Therefore, those that 
replied “yes” are coded as 1, while the respondents that answered “no” are coded as 2. It 
is important to note that the reply of “yes” does not necessarily mean that influenced their 
decision to vote or not to vote for a certain party. Instead, it can refer to deciding to vote 
at all or not to vote at all. It can also mean changing one’s party preference. It is a general 
question asking if the Catalan Independence Movement had any influence at all on one’s 
voting behavior prior to the November 2019 general election. 
The variable of self-placement on a left-right scale is simple. It is a scale of 1 to 
10 with 1 corresponding to the “most left” and 10 corresponding to the “most right.” 
 Table 4-2 displays similar descriptive data of the independent variables that was 
shown in Table 4-1 regarding the dependent variables. Also included is the minimum and 
maximum for each variable since the variables have varying numbers of categories and 
ways in which they were coded.  
 
Table 4-2 Here  
 
Methodology 
From my hypotheses discussed earlier in this paper, the variables I am most interested 
in are the political evaluation, the direct question about if the Catalan Independence 
Movement affected the vote, and both major issue variables (immigration and the Catalan 
Independence Movement). Regarding Spain, both immigration and controversy surround 
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decentralization are topics of interest regarding the choice to vote for far-right nationalist 
political parties. However, throughout this analysis, I will also be looking at demographic 
variables, other evaluation variables, and other political variables. I will be conducting 
five logistic regression models for each of my five dependent variables. The models will 
be organized in the following manner: 
● Model 1: Demographic variables only 
● Model 2: Demographic and performance variables 
● Model 3: Demographic and political variables 
● Model 4: Repetition of Model 3 with the deletion of one political variable 
● Model 5: All variables 
Each model includes all demographic and economic variables. Models 2 and 3 are 
straightforward in that they will build on Model 1 with one additional category of the 
independent variables each. Model 4 is almost exactly the same as Model 3, but it 
excludes whether the Catalan Independence Movement influenced the vote of the 
respondent. Since this variable could potentially be very similar to the Major Issue 
variable pertaining to the Catalan Independence Movement, I wanted to see the 




 Below, Tables 4-3, 4-4, 4-5, 4-6, and 4-7 show the results of the regression 
analysis done for each dependent variable. The data shows that the most distinction 
between voters of regionalist and nationalist parties come from the demographic 
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variables. However, there are also many variables that prove significant in the same ways 
across all the party types showing that they are significant for both types of the peripheral 
parties in the same way. All hypotheses with the exception of H4 have at least some 
support in the data.  
 
Nationalist Parties 
 “Nationalist parties” includes both Ciudadanos and Vox. While Vox is a more 
extreme, peripheral party, Ciudadanos is becoming more mainstream. This means that 
this category may contain a more general group of respondents and voters. Table 4-3 
shows the results of regression analysis. There are a number of variables that are highly 
significant with a few that are highly significant in all models. This analysis of the 
nationalist parties provides support for H1 in Model 2, H2 in Models 3 and 5, and H3 in 
Models 3-5. H4 does not have support with nationalist parties. Since respondents for 
“nationalist parties” also said that the Catalan Independence Movement did have an 
influence on their vote, this could signify that while they see it as important, these voters 
do not see it as one of the top three major issues in Spain. In a more targeted question 
where they do not have to prioritize issues, it matters. However, in a more general 
question that contains a multitude of potential responses, it is not as important. If this is 
the case and the reasoning behind this unexpected result, then it could signify that the 
idea of the Catalan Independence Movement is not as important to these voters as 
previously thought.  
 Other significant variables with regard to the intention to vote for nationalist 
parties are age, religiosity, personal income, the economic evaluation, and the left-right 
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self-placement. These results suggest that those more likely to vote for nationalist parties 
are younger, more religious, have a higher income, have negative feelings about the 
economy, and have a more right-leaning ideology. In some of the models, male 
respondents are slightly more likely to support nationalist parties. These results do not 
support the losers of modernization theory since they are not only not significantly lower 
income but they tend to have a higher income. However, these results do support a 
common idea that individuals who are more traditional and religious would be more 
likely to vote for anti-immigrant, far-right parties as a result of seeing them as a threat to 
their religious and conservative values (Ortiz Barquero 2019). 
 
Table 4-3 Here  
 
Vox 
 Vox supporters seem to be a more specific group. When isolating these voters, we 
can see more significant relationships and determinants with this particular analysis. 
Table 4-4 displays the results from the regression models focusing only on Vox 
supporters. From this table, we can see similar support for these hypotheses as those of 
the nationalist parties. H1, H2, and H3 all have support while H4 does not have support. 
Like the voters of the “nationalist” category, Vox-specific voters are generally younger, 
more religious, with a higher income, negative feelings about the economy, and right 
leaning. However, what differs from the voters of the larger category is that Vox voters 
are also less educated and more significantly male. This difference helps us distinguish 
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between those that choose to vote for a less extreme alternative with the voters who chose 
to vote more extreme.  
 
Table 4-4 Here  
 
Regionalist Parties 
 The results of the regression analysis of support for regionalist parties are shown 
in Table 4-5. Since H3 only pertained to Vox and nationalist parties, H3 is excluded from 
this analysis. According to the results of this regression, H1 and H2 both have support. 
H4 has support in Model 4 when the variable that may be causing its significance to not 
surface is removed from the regression. With regionalist parties, there is not significance 
with the gender of the respondents nor with the choice of immigration as a major issue. In 
addition to the variables discussed in the hypotheses, the profile of a voter for regionalist 
parties is older (in some models), less religious, with higher level of education, higher 
income, negative feelings about economic situation, and left-leaning ideology.  
 
Table 4-5 Here  
 
 
Catalan Regionalist Parties 
 Narrowing down the broad “regionalist parties”' variable to just Catalan 
regionalist parties in Table 4-6, we see that there is similar support for three hypotheses 
with H1, H2, and H4 all having support. However, H4 does have more support with this 
series of regression. This makes sense as the Catalan Independence Movement is perhaps 
most salient for voters of Catalan-specific regionalist parties. Similar to the larger 
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category of regionalist parties, there is no significant relationship with seeing 
immigration as a major issue. However, there is some significance in some models with 
voters being female. Other than this difference, the voter profile is nearly identical to the 
larger category.  
 
Table 4-6 Here  
 
Galician Regionalist Parties 
 The voters for the Galician regionalist parties are the most different compared to 
the other regionalist party dependent variables. The results of each regression model are 
shown in Table 4-7. Of the hypotheses, there is no support for any of the hypotheses. In 
fact, the opposite is true for H4 which states that the Catalan Independence Movement 
will be seen as a major issue for voters of all types of parties. While H4 has had the least 
support of any of the hypotheses, with Galician regionalist party voters there is actually a 
significant relationship of not seeing the Catalan Independence Movement as a major 
issue.  
 The profile of a Galician regionalist party voter is female (in some models), less 
religious, with higher education, negative feelings about the economy, and left-leaning 
ideology. The variables that have no significant relationship are age, personal income, the 
political evaluation, seeing immigration as a major issue, and the influence of the Catalan 
Independence Movement on the vote.  
 




Results Summary and Discussion 
 By looking at each set of regressions for each dependent variable together, we can 
see which variables are the most influential and which of my original hypotheses have the 
most support throughout all the dependent variables and models. These individual-level 
determinants can help form a profile of a certain type of voter whether it be a voter for 
regionalist or nationalist political parties.  
H1 which stated that as negative feelings about the current political situation 
increase, the support for peripheral parties would increase is supported in the analysis. 
This was supported by all sets of regression models with the exception of Galician 
regionalist party voters. It makes sense that a dissatisfaction with the current political 
climate and mainstream parties would lead to voters looking elsewhere for their support. 
This is reminiscent of the idea of the linkage theory in which parties that fail to represent 
or connect with the voters “fail” (Lawson and Merkl 1988). 
H2 that connected the choice to vote for peripheral parties with marking yes that 
their vote was influenced by the Catalan Independence Movement is also supported in a 
similar manner. All sets of regression models supported this hypothesis except Galician 
regionalist parties. The mechanism linking these variables is of course that a strong 
opinion about the Catalan independence movement would lead to voting for a party that 
also has clear stances on this movement. That would of course refer to nearly all of our 
parties including nationalist, Vox, regionalist, and Catalan regionalist. However, it also 
would help understand why Galician regionalist parties do not have support for this 
hypothesis. Galician regionalist parties are somewhat separate from this issue as they are 
not directly for or against Catalan independence. 
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 H3 focused more on nationalist parties or more specifically, Vox. It stated that 
respondents who perceive immigration as a major issue in Spain would be the 
respondents more likely to vote for nationalist parties or Vox in particular. This was 
supported by the relevant sets of regressions. Immigration was an important variable 
pertaining to the nationalist type parties but not with the regionalist type parties.  
 H4 was the least supported hypothesis. It stated that voters of all types of parties 
would record the Catalan Independence Movement as a major issue in Spain. However, 
this was primarily only done by respondents who voted for Catalan Regionalist Parties. 
However, it is interesting to note that all types of parties, excluding Galician regionalist 
parties, had a significant relationship with the variable of the influence that the movement 
had on their vote. This shows that while it did influence their vote in some way, it was 
not important enough to be considered a major issue in Spain by the nationalist parties, 
Vox, and regionalist parties (except in one model). 
 The analysis reveals certain variables that were very important or significant but 
were not predicted by my hypotheses. These were age, religiosity, gender, education 
level, personal income, the economic evaluation, and self-placement on the ideological 
scale. There was some variation in how these variables were related to the different 
dependent variables and in some cases if they were significant at all. These specific 
results are summarized in Table 4-8. This table summarizes the profiles of each type of 
voter with each significant variable. However, it is important to note that some of these 
significant variables are only significant in some of the models.  
 




 These results demonstrate that it is primarily demographic variables that affect 
voting behavior for Spain’s peripheral parties. These demographic variables are more 
important in the analysis compared to general policy opinions and perceptions of the 
current state of politics and the economy in Spain. Seeing regionalist and nationalist 
political parties as opposites across the center-periphery cleavage in Spain has support in 
the demographic “opposites” seen in the analysis. Many of the general political variables 
such as having negative feelings about the current state of Spain are significant in the 
same manner for both types of peripheral parties. This leads to the conclusion that while 
certain dissatisfaction can lead to a voter choosing to support a party on the periphery, the 
demographic variables are determinants of which side of the center-periphery divide to 










Demographic Variables     
Gender 
(1 = Male) 
0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Age 50.96 17.90 18 98 
Religiosity (1= Most Religious, 3 = 
Least Religious) 
2.05 0.73 1.00 3.00 
Education Level 4.22 1.60 1.00 7.00 
Economic Variables     
Personal Income 4.32 2.09 1.00 11.00 
Performance Variables     
Economic Evaluation (1 = Positive 
Feelings) 
2.45 0.60 1.00 3.00 
Political Evaluation 
(1 = Positive Feelings) 
2.78 0.46 1.00 3.00 
Political Variables     
Catalan Independence Movement as 
Major Issue (1 = Yes) 
0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 
Immigration as Major Issue (1 = Yes) 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Catalan Independence Movement 
Influence on Vote (2 = No) 
1.57 0.50 1.00 2.00 
Left-Right Orientation Scale (1= 
Most Left; 10 = Most Right) 
4.67 2.07 1.00 10.00 





Table 4-3 Logistic Regression with Dependent Variable: Votes for Nationalist Parties 























































  0.184 
(0.163) 
Major Issue: Catalan 
Independence 
Movement 












No Influence of 
Catalan Independence 
on Vote 













LR chi square 131.36 154.82 588.86 571.56 599.46 
P-value 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0515 0.0613 0.2541 0.2451 0.2608 
Source: “Barómetro de Noviembre 2019” (2019)   





Table 4-4 Logistic Regression with Dependent Variable: Votes for Vox 





























































  0.849*** 
(0.295) 
Major Issue: Catalan 
Independence 
Movement 














No Influence of 
Catalan Independence 
on Vote 













LR chi square 111.42 189.50 515.42 503.49 564.99 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0631 0.1085 0.3224 0.3132 0.3566 
Source: “Barómetro de Noviembre 2019” (2019)   




Table 4-5 Logistic Regression with Dependent Variable: Votes for Regionalist Parties 





























































  1.197*** 
(0.349) 
Major Issue: Catalan 
Independence 
Movement 














No Influence of Catalan 
Independence on Vote 





Right Scale (Right) 






LR chi square 123.15 169.31 305.85 209.75 346.74 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0960 0.1325 0.2486 0.1693 0.2826 
Source: “Barómetro de Noviembre 2019” (2019)   




Table 4-6 Logistic Regression with Dependent Variable: Votes for Catalan Regionalist 
Parties 





























































  2.671*** 
(0.729) 
Major Issue: Catalan 
Independence Movement 














No Influence of Catalan 
Independence on Vote 





Right Scale (Right) 






LR chi square 88.58 144.23 270.49 152.10 321.11 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0830 0.1356 0.2629 0.1475 0.3129 
Source: “Barómetro de Noviembre 2019” (2019)   




Table 4-7 Logistic Regression with Dependent Variable: Votes for Galician Regionalist 
Parties 





























































  -0.456 
(0.410) 
Major Issue: Catalan 
Independence Movement 














No Influence of Catalan 
Independence on Vote 





Right Scale (Right) 






LR chi square 41.19 48.30 75.07 75.63 80.33 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1064 0.1251 0.2032 0.1996 0.2178 
Source: “Barómetro de Noviembre 2019” (2019)   


















Demographic Variables     
Gender male male  --- female female 
Age younger younger older older --- 






less religious less religious 








Economic Variables     
Personal Income higher higher higher higher --- 






























Major Issue  
--- --- yes yes no 
Immigration as 
Major Issue  




Influence on Vote  
yes yes yes yes --- 
Left-Right 
Orientation Scale  
right right left left left 
Source: “Barómetro de Noviembre 2019” (2019)   
 





Spain is an interesting case to study political parties and determinants of voting 
behavior because not only does the typical left-right cleavage exist, but there is also a 
center-periphery divide. This is the result of Spain’s division into seventeen autonomous 
communities. Some of these autonomous communities, designated historic nations, have 
their own culture and language, and some were granted higher levels of autonomy earlier 
on in their history. These particular parties have had strong levels of support for 
regionalist political parties. Some of these autonomous communities and political parties 
have even advocated for independence with varying levels of support and success. 
However, peripheral regionalist parties exist all throughout Spain as does the sense of 
belonging to a group other than the “Spanish nation”.  
 Other political parties have appeared to oppose substate nationalism. Ciudadanos 
was created specifically in opposition to Catalan nationalism, and more recently Vox has 
emerged a strong proponent of “Spanish-only” nationalism. The purpose of my research 
was to study why support for these different types of parties varies across Spain.   
In this paper, I used logistic regression to analyze the most important 
determinants of voting for five specific groups of political parties in Spain. These parties 
were “nationalist”, Vox, “regionalist”, “Catalan regionalist”, and “Galician regionalist.” 
From this analysis, I was able to determine that the demographic variables of gender, age, 
religiosity, and education level as well as the self-placement on a left-right ideological 
scale showed the most difference between the two broad categories of parties. Other 
 




variables such as economic evaluation, political evaluation, the influence of the Catalan 
independence movement on the vote, and income were almost always significant but in 
the same manner for all types of peripheral parties with no distinction between 
“nationalist” and “regionalist” parties.  
From my findings, I found that negative feelings about the current economic and 
political situation, a higher income, and having one’s vote be influenced by the Catalan 
Independence Movement were the general variables that led to voting for the parties on 
the periphery. The variables that distinguished between voting for regionalist and 
nationalist parties were primarily the demographic variables as well as the left-right 
preferences. Nationalist and Vox voters were generally male, younger, more religious, 
less educated, and had a right-leaning ideology. Most regionalist voters were generally 
female, older, less religious, more educated, and had a left-leaning ideology. 
While much existing research exists looking at autonomous communities as a 
whole regarding support for certain types of parties in Spain, this research looks only at 
individual-level data. While research analyzing data at the level of autonomous 
communities looks at variables such as GDP per capita and other broad variables, this 
analysis shows that on an individual-level, personal socioeconomic status does not seem 
to have an impact on voting intention. This analysis allows a closer look at the individual 
voters that exist within the broader context of their autonomous communities.  
From the results of the analysis, one can see that demographic variables are the 
primary distinction between regionalist and nationalist voters. Topics that one might 
assume to be more impactful, such as specific political opinions on immigration and 
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decentralization, turn out to not be as important when differentiating between these two 
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